Bibliography and Further Reading

Textbooks

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Free online resources

- Osborne & Rubinstein, *A Course in Game Theory* and Rubinstein's other books: `https://arielrubinstein.tau.ac.il/`
- *Algorithmic Game Theory* (Nisan et al.): free PDF from Cambridge/authors' pages; Roughgarden's lecture videos and notes: `https://timroughgarden.org/`
- Stanford/UBC Coursera course "Game Theory" (Jackson, Leyton-Brown, Shoham); Yale Open Courses ECON 159 "Game Theory" (Ben Polak)—excellent video lectures matching Parts I–II.
- *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*: entries "Game Theory," "Evolutionary Game Theory," "Epistemic Foundations of Game Theory."
- Game Theory Society: `https://gametheorysociety.org/` (surveys, world congress materials, book lists).