Bibliography and Further Reading

Textbooks

Osborne, M. J. (2004).

An Introduction to Game Theory. Oxford University Press. The most complete rigorous undergraduate text; the natural companion to Parts I–II of this book.

Gibbons, R. (1992).

Game Theory for Applied Economists. Princeton University Press. Compact, applications-first; superb on the four-cell roadmap of Table [tab:roadmap].

Dixit, A., Skeath, S., & Reiley, D. (2015).

Games of Strategy (4th ed.). Norton. Gentlest entry point.

Osborne, M. J., & Rubinstein, A. (1994).

A Course in Game Theory. MIT Press. Elegant graduate core; freely available on Rubinstein’s website.

Fudenberg, D., & Tirole, J. (1991).

Game Theory. MIT Press. The encyclopedic graduate reference, strongest on dynamic games and refinements.

Myerson, R. B. (1991).

Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict. Harvard University Press. Systematic, deep; unified treatment of noncooperative and cooperative theory.

Maschler, M., Solan, E., & Zamir, S. (2020).

Game Theory (2nd ed.). Cambridge University Press. The most comprehensive and mathematically complete modern text.

Krishna, V. (2010).

Auction Theory (2nd ed.). Academic Press.

Börgers, T. (2015).

An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design. Oxford University Press.

Roth, A. E., & Sotomayor, M. (1990).

Two-Sided Matching. Cambridge University Press.

Mailath, G. J., & Samuelson, L. (2006).

Repeated Games and Reputations. Oxford University Press.

Weibull, J. W. (1995).

Evolutionary Game Theory. MIT Press.

Sandholm, W. H. (2010).

Population Games and Evolutionary Dynamics. MIT Press.

Nisan, N., Roughgarden, T., Tardos, É., & Vazirani, V. (eds.) (2007).

Algorithmic Game Theory. Cambridge University Press. Free online.

Roughgarden, T. (2016).

Twenty Lectures on Algorithmic Game Theory. Cambridge University Press.

Camerer, C. F. (2003).

Behavioral Game Theory. Princeton University Press.

Perea, A. (2012).

Epistemic Game Theory: Reasoning and Choice. Cambridge University Press.

Schelling, T. C. (1960).

The Strategy of Conflict. Harvard University Press. The classic on focal points, commitment, and credibility—still unmatched as strategic prose.

von Neumann, J., & Morgenstern, O. (1944).

Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. Princeton University Press. Where it all began.

Landmark articles

von Neumann, J. (1928).

Zur Theorie der Gesellschaftsspiele. Mathematische Annalen 100, 295–320. (Minimax Theorem.)

Nash, J. (1950).

Equilibrium points in \(n\)-person games. PNAS 36, 48–49; and (1951) Non-cooperative games. Annals of Mathematics 54, 286–295.

Nash, J. (1950).

The bargaining problem. Econometrica 18, 155–162.

Shapley, L. S. (1953).

A value for \(n\)-person games. In Contributions to the Theory of Games II; and (1953) Stochastic games. PNAS 39, 1095–1100.

Vickrey, W. (1961).

Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders. Journal of Finance 16, 8–37.

Gale, D., & Shapley, L. S. (1962).

College admissions and the stability of marriage. American Mathematical Monthly 69, 9–15.

Selten, R. (1965, 1975).

Subgame perfection and trembling-hand perfection. Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft 121; IJGT 4, 25–55.

Harsanyi, J. C. (1967–68).

Games with incomplete information played by “Bayesian” players, I–III. Management Science 14.

Akerlof, G. A. (1970).

The market for “lemons.” QJE 84, 488–500.

Maynard Smith, J., & Price, G. R. (1973).

The logic of animal conflict. Nature 246, 15–18.

Spence, M. (1973).

Job market signaling. QJE 87, 355–374.

Aumann, R. J. (1974).

Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies. JME 1, 67–96; and (1976) Agreeing to disagree. Annals of Statistics 4, 1236–1239.

Kreps, D., & Wilson, R. (1982).

Sequential equilibria. Econometrica 50, 863–894; and, with Milgrom and Roberts, the “gang of four” reputation papers, JET 27.

Rubinstein, A. (1982).

Perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model. Econometrica 50, 97–109.

Crawford, V., & Sobel, J. (1982).

Strategic information transmission. Econometrica 50, 1431–1451.

Milgrom, P., & Weber, R. (1982).

A theory of auctions and competitive bidding. Econometrica 50, 1089–1122.

Myerson, R. B. (1981).

Optimal auction design. Mathematics of Operations Research 6, 58–73; and, with Satterthwaite (1983), Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading. JET 29, 265–281.

Fudenberg, D., & Maskin, E. (1986).

The folk theorem in repeated games with discounting or with incomplete information. Econometrica 54, 533–554.

Cho, I.-K., & Kreps, D. (1987).

Signaling games and stable equilibria. QJE 102, 179–221.

McKelvey, R., & Palfrey, T. (1995).

Quantal response equilibria for normal form games. GEB 10, 6–38.

Monderer, D., & Shapley, L. S. (1996).

Potential games. GEB 14, 124–143.

Morris, S., & Shin, H. S. (1998).

Unique equilibrium in a model of self-fulfilling currency attacks. AER 88, 587–597.

Roughgarden, T., & Tardos, É. (2002).

How bad is selfish routing? JACM 49, 236–259.

Daskalakis, C., Goldberg, P., & Papadimitriou, C. (2009).

The complexity of computing a Nash equilibrium. SIAM J. Computing 39, 195–259; with Chen & Deng (2009), Settling the complexity of two-player Nash. JACM 56(3).

Kamenica, E., & Gentzkow, M. (2011).

Bayesian persuasion. AER 101, 2590–2615.

Bowling, M., Burch, N., Johanson, M., & Tammelin, O. (2015).

Heads-up limit hold’em poker is solved. Science 347, 145–149.

Free online resources

• Osborne & Rubinstein, A Course in Game Theory and Rubinstein’s other books: https://arielrubinstein.tau.ac.il/

• Algorithmic Game Theory (Nisan et al.): free PDF from Cambridge/authors’ pages; Roughgarden’s lecture videos and notes: https://timroughgarden.org/

• Stanford/UBC Coursera course “Game Theory” (Jackson, Leyton-Brown, Shoham); Yale Open Courses ECON 159 “Game Theory” (Ben Polak)—excellent video lectures matching Parts I–II.

• Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: entries “Game Theory,” “Evolutionary Game Theory,” “Epistemic Foundations of Game Theory.”

• Game Theory Society: https://gametheorysociety.org/ (surveys, world congress materials, book lists).