Economic Applications: Markets and Strategy
The concepts of Part I earn their keep in applications. This chapter analyzes the canonical models of imperfect competition and collective action—workhorses of industrial organization and public economics.
阅读文章 →Bargaining
How is a surplus divided when two parties must agree to realize it? Bargaining theory has two complementary traditions: Nash's axiomatic approach (what properties should a solution have?) and Rubinstein's strategic appro
阅读文章 →Repeated Games and the Emergence of Cooperation
The Prisoner's Dilemma predicts defection—yet cooperation among self-interested parties is everywhere: cartels hold, merchants extend credit, countries honor treaties, strangers leave tips at restaurants they'll revisit.
阅读文章 →Bayesian Games: Incomplete Information
Until now, everyone knew everyone's payoffs. In reality, a bidder doesn't know rivals' valuations; an insurer doesn't know the applicant's risk; a poker player doesn't see opponents' cards. Modeling such incomplete infor
阅读文章 →Dynamic Games with Incomplete Information: Signaling and Screening
When informed players move first, their actions speak: choices reveal, conceal, or distort private information. This chapter develops perfect Bayesian equilibrium and its two flagship applications—signaling and cheap tal
阅读文章 →Zero-Sum Games and the Minimax Theorem
Pure conflict—what one wins, the other loses—is where game theory began, and where its theory is most complete. Zero-sum games also connect game theory to optimization (linear programming) and to machine learning (advers
阅读文章 →Existence of Equilibrium and Refinements
This chapter supplies the rigorous core of non-cooperative theory: why equilibria exist, and how to discipline the multiplicity of equilibria in dynamic games.
阅读文章 →Mechanism Design and Auction Theory
Mechanism design inverts game theory: instead of analyzing a given game, design the game so that self-interested equilibrium play produces the outcome you want. It is the theory behind spectrum auctions, ad exchanges, sc
阅读文章 →Cooperative Game Theory
Cooperative (coalitional) theory abstracts from individual moves and asks two questions: which coalitions form, and how are the gains divided? Its solution concepts—the core and the Shapley value—are now everyday tools f
阅读文章 →Evolutionary Game Theory
Maynard Smith's export of game theory to biology replaced rationality with selection: strategies that earn higher payoffs (fitness) reproduce faster. The resulting theory illuminates animal conflict, the evolution of coo
阅读文章 →Algorithmic Game Theory
Computer science met game theory when the internet became a system of interacting selfish agents—routers, bidders, miners, platforms. Three founding questions organize the field (Nisan–Roughgarden–Tardos–Vazirani): Can e
阅读文章 →Frontiers: Behavioral, Experimental, and Modern Directions
The final chapter surveys where game theory is being tested, revised, and extended. Each section states the core departure from the classical theory, the leading models, and pointers into the literature.
阅读文章 →Preface
Game theory is the mathematical study of strategic interaction: situations in which the outcome for each participant depends not only on their own decisions but also on the decisions of others. Born in the 1940s from the
阅读文章 →Solutions Part1
(a) Two players, three actions each, simultaneous, complete information. (b) Seller and buyer; seller moves first (set price / describe car), buyer accepts or not; sequential with incomplete information (quality is the s
阅读文章 →Solutions Part2
If the rival bids v_j/2, bidding b wins with probability (v_j/2 < b) = 2b (for b 12); expected profit (v - b) 2b is maximized at b = v/2. Revenue: = 12 · 23 = 13 = , the second-price revenue—revenue equivalence verified.
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